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Milton's Theology of the Cross: 
Substitution and Satisfaction in Christ's Atonement 
Samuel Smith 
Abstract: Recent scholarship on John Milton argues that Milton 
rejected the popular Reformation understanding of Christ's atonement, the 
penal-substitutionary theory of atonement, and that Milton was 
uncomfortable with the Crucifixion of Jesus as God's means of human 
salvation. A close reading of Milton's Paradise Lost and De Doctrina 
Christiana clearly shows, however, that Milton did in fact embrace the 
penal-substitutionary theory of atonement, and he believed that Jesus' 
death on the cross effected this atonement. Milton's decision not to 
dwell on the cross or the details of the crucifixion in his poetry does not 
manifest a rejection of the cross as God's means of effecting atonement. 
A surging tide of recent Milton criticism advances a Milton 
who has become our contemporary, a poet-theologian who 
shares our moral discomfort with Christ's crucifixion as a 
divinely-ordained sacrifice that atones for the sins of humanity, 
where Christ substitutes his own bloody death for a guilty and 
justly condemned humanity in order to satisfy the wrath of God. As 
a Christian who rejects the penal-substitutionary theory of 
atonement, with its implications for an unethical God who requires 
the crucifixion of his Son, I would be most gratified if Milton were 
indeed our contemporary on this score. 1 Recent critical efforts to 
distance Milton from penal-substitutionary atonement parallel the 
critical situation concerning Milton's Samson and his relation to 
Milton's Son in Paradise Regained. In his illuminating description and 
assessment of this trend, David Loewenstein remarks that "there 
has been a notable tendency among recent critics to argue that 
ultimately Milton wants his readers to sympathize with the 
pacifism, quietism, and patience of Jesus in Paradise Regain'd and 
to reject 
the Old Testament violence and militarism of Samson in its companion 
piece, Samson Agonistes" (276). Loewenstein shrewdly suggests that this 
tendency is motivated by our commitment to rendering Milton more like 
ourselves, shaping him to fit "our own (more acceptable) image of the 
radical visionary poet who, unlike the Samson of his dramatic poem, could 
never or who could no longer, after the Restoration, condone an act of holy 
violence and vehement rage as a devastating yet creative and heroic political 
act" (278). I suspect that recent criticism on Milton and the crucifixion and/ 
or the atonement may be similarly motivated by the desire to render Milton 
more like ourselves. 
In his reading of"On the Circumcision;' John Rogers claims that Milton's 
apparent "neglect of the Crucifixion'' reflects his "provisional faith in man's 
ability to effect his own salvation, without the help of a sacrificial redeemer" 
(190), arguing that Milton rejected the dominant seventeenth-century 
theory of atonement-the Reformers' revision of Anselm's "satisfaction'' 
theory, what C. A. Patrides calls a "penal-substitutionary atonement" 
(136)-in favor of the early Church's "recapitulation" theory of atonement 
(193).2 In doing so, Rogers asserts that Milton exposes "the savage logic 
of revenge and the plight of human helplessness at the emotional core of 
the Christian Crucifixion'' (210), presenting the "virtuous human action" 
of circumcision as "a rational correction to the act of substitutive sacrifice 
which lay at the heart of Christianity" (213). More recently, Gregory Chaplin 
has argued for a Milton who resolves his "vexed relation to the Crucifixion" 
by rejecting Anselmian theories of atoning "satisfaction'' and embracing 
instead an Arian Son whose sacrifice becomes "an ethical decision" rooted 
in "the classical friendship tradition" (356).3 While Chaplin reasonably 
identifies a relative resistance to the "spectacle" (367) of crucifixion on 
Milton's part, he mistakenly assumes that this entails a rejection of penal­
substitutionary atonement as well, and that this rejection is evident in, and 
supported by, Milton's Arianism. A more radical expression of this growing 
consensus comes from Gordon Teskey, who claims that "Milton as a poet 
was largely unmoved by the two definitive images of Christian worship: the 
baby in its mother's arms and the man on the cross" (485). Teskey goes on 
to say-minus the qualifier here-that "Milton was unmoved by the baby 
in its mother's arms and by the man on the cross because they are images 
of helplessness, not of power, and their appeal is to the emotions, rather 
than to the instincts for order and for command" ( 485-86). But this assumes 
that if Milton never wrote about the crucifixion of Jesus in the agonized 
fashion of a George Herbert, he was not moved by Christ's passion-such a 
conclusion does not necessarily follow, of course, and Teskey's assumption 
mistakes the absence of evidence for evidence of absence. 
In a more circumspect and convincing query into the "poetics of 
sacrifice" and atonement, Michael Schoenfeldt reads Milton's "The Passion'' 
as a possible site of resistance to the "plight of human helplessness at the 
emotional core of the Christian Crucifixion" -a plight more evident in 
poets like Donne and Herbert.4 Schoenfeldt is justified in suggesting that 
in his epics Milton is "far more interested in moral rectitude than in salvific 
suffering" (580), and it is possible that Milton may at times have experienced 
the crucifixion as a "sacrifice [which] inevitably defeats human response" 
(581). But it does not necessarily follow that "Milton deliberately relocates 
the atonement from a scenario of corporeal martyrdom to a moment of 
ethical decision' '  (581). As we shall see, for Milton the atonement clearly 
requires Christ's "corporeal martyrdom;' and Milton embraces in both 
his poetry and prose the crucifixion as an effectual penal-substitutionary 
sacrifice for human sin, one which satisfies divine justice. That ethical 
decision necessarily entails corporeal martyrdom. The Son in Paradise 
Regained discerns from his reading of Hebrew scripture that he must follow 
a path of suffering that will likely end in his death-"Ere I the promis'd 
Kingdom can attain, / Or work Redemption for mankind, whose sins' I
Full weight must be transferr'd upon my head" (1.265-67). Here the Son 
clearly speaks of his substitutionary atonement for sinful humanity.5 This 
understanding of atonement through crucifixion appears in both Milton's 
prose and poetry, providing sufficient evidence for his lifelong commitment 
to the crucifixion as the site of humanity's redemption. 
Despite Rogers' cavalier dismissal of C. A. Patrides' account of Milton 
and the atonement, Patrides remains a helpful initiation to Milton's Christian 
understanding of the atonement. 6 Patrides delineates the ways in which 
Reformation theologians developed a penal-substitutionary atonement 
theory from Anselm's classic "satisfaction' '  theory. Their primary revision 
featured a more exclusive use of "juridical terms" to present the atonement 
as "a legal transaction, as a 'contract
"' ( 135). Patrides' summary of this theory 
uses the language of the Reformers, which we find repeated in Milton's De 
Doctrina Christiana and Paradise Lost: the crucifixion fulfills a contract 
"whereby the debt paid to the Supreme Judge was considered to be both the 
satisfaction demanded by divine justice and the just punishment required for 
our sins"; in his death on the cross, "Jesus substituted for us, according to the 
Reformers, and in a just payment of our sins diverted the wrath of God upon 
himself' (135, my emphases). That God's justice required such satisfaction 
was for the Reformers "in accordance with the established and unalterable 
law of God" (136). In other words, as Patrides makes clear, the necessity of 
divine punishment for transgression against God's moral law functions as 
a theological datum for reformers like Calvin and Luther. I will show that 
Milton largely agrees with this approach to atonement, although he does 
diverge in important ways, most significantly in having his distinctly Arian 
Son satisfy divine justice in his sacrifice on the cross. I will also suggest why 
Milton was committed to this understanding of atonement. 
Milton's own clear assertion in De Doctrina Christiana that divine 
justice must necessarily condemn Adam and all his posterity needs no 
defense from his point of view; this claim appears as a theological datum 
authorized by Scripture. Nevertheless, while citing Exod. 20:5, Num. 14:33, 
Lev. 26:29, and Ezek. 18:4, he identifies a universal principle which affirms 
this: "Moreover, it is not only a constant principle of divine justice but 
also a very ancient law among all races and all religions, that when a man 
has committed sacrilege (and this tree we are discussing was sacred), not 
only he but also the whole of his posterity becomes an anathema and a 
sin-offering" (De Doctrina Christiana 385).7 "Die hee, or justice must"­
this is important: if we are looking for justification for this principle from 
Milton, we won't find it. This is simply a given for him. What we find instead 
are repeated articulations of human redemption from sin employing the 
language of the contract-based, penal-substitutionary atonement doctrine 
which dominated Protestant Reformation theology. 
Key terms in De Doctrina Christiana reflecting Milton's commitment 
to-and comfort with-this theory of atonement include "satisfaction;' 
"sacrifice;' "redemption;' "blood;' "price;' "paid;' "appeasement;' and, of 
course, "divine justice:' Milton clearly marks the crucifixion as the primary 
act which effects atonement between God and humanity when he defines the 
term "redemption' ' :  "REDEMPTION IS THAT ACT BY WHICH CHRIST, 
SENT IN THE FULNESS OF TIME, REDEEMED ALL BELIEVERS AT 
THE PRICE OF HIS OWN BLOOD, WHICH HE PAID VOLUNTARILY, 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ETERNAL PLAN AND GRACE OF 
GOD THE FATHER'' (415-16, my emphases). When Milton prooftexts 
the phrase, "AT THE PRICE OF HIS OWN BLOOD;' he cites verses which 
include the terms he favors for understanding atonement: "Rom. iii. 25: 
a means of appeasement through faith in his blood; I Car. vi. 20: they are 
bought with a price ... ; Rev. i. 5: he has washed us clean of our sins with 
his blood" (417, my emphases). Scripture authorizes Milton's acceptance of 
the redemptive violence of blood sacrifice, and he does not shy away from 
embracing this doctrine. 
Equally important to Milton's understanding of atonement is the 
voluntary nature of the Son's incarnation and sacrifice, which Milton 
identifies as the Son's "humiliation": "His HUMILIATION means that 
CHRIST, AS 8EAN8PQI10I:, GOD-MAN, SUBMITTED HIMSELF 
VOLUNTARILY, BOTH IN LIFE AND IN DEATH, TO THE DIVINE 
JUSTICE, IN ORDER TO SUFFER ALL THE THINGS WHICH WERE 
NECESSARY FOR OUR REDEMPTION" (438, my emphases). When he 
explicates the biblical support related to the phrase, "IN DEATH;' Milton 
remarks the curse associated with crucifixion and Christ's pain in bearing 
divine wrath: "IN DEATH. Psal. xxii. Philipp. ii. 8: made obedient right up to 
his death, even the death of the cross: a death which was a supreme disgrace, 
Deut. xxi. 23: the hanged man is accursed in the sight of God, and the curse 
due to us was transferred to him, Gal. iii. 13, along with a horrifying 
awareness of divine anger being poured upon him, an awareness which led 
to that dying cry, Matt. xxvii. 46: my God, my God, why have you forsaken 
me?" ( 439). Here Milton's language of substitution appears in "the curse due 
to us was transferred to him" (the precise term used by Milton's Son in the 
passage from Paradise Regained cited above). 
Perhaps the most important word for Milton's theory of atonement is 
that associated with Anselm-"satisfaction' ' :  "SATISFACTION means that 
CHRIST AS 8EAN8PQI10I: FULLY SATISFIED DIVINE JUSTICE BY 
FULFILLING THE LAW AND PAYING THE JUST PRICE ON BEHALF 
OF ALL MEN" (443, my emphases). For Milton, Christ's blood payment 
clearly indicates a substitution: "THE PRICE ON BEHALF OF (i.e., in 
place of)" (444; Milton cites Matt. 20:28, 1 Cor. 6:20, and 1 Tim. 2:6). In 
case there is any doubt, Milton adds, "[t]he Greek words plainly signify the 
substitution of one person for another" ( 444, my emphasis; Milton cites 1 
Pet. 1:18, Rom. 5:10 and 4:25, 1 Cor. 15:3, 2 Cor. 5:21, Tit. 2:14, Gal. 1:4, 
Heb. 7:22 and 10:12, 29). He continues with a dig at the Socinian position, 
in terms that might as readily be applied to Milton scholars who wish to 
distance Milton from a belief which many of us find unethical, but to which 
Milton was committed: "[t]hose who maintain that Christ sought death not 
in our place and for the sake of redemption, but only for our good and to 
set an example, try in vain to evade the evidence of these texts" ( 444, my 
emphasis). Here Milton clearly speaks of Christ seeking death in the place of 
humanity in order to effect atonement. He also speaks of this satisfaction in 
terms of sufficiency. Thinking perhaps of virtuous theistic "pagans;' or the 
devout figures who live in the pages of the Hebrew Bible, Milton extends 
Christ's penal-substitutionary atonement to all believers in God who never 
heard the name of Christ: " [ s] ince, moreover, the price of redemption which 
he has paid is sufficient for all mankind, it follows that everyone is called to 
share in that grace although not everyone may know how the grace is given . 
... How much more, then, ought we to believe that Christ's perfect sacrifice is 
in every way sufficient even for those who have never heard of his name, but 
who only believe in God" (455, my emphases; see also 475). 
Milton's understanding of Christ's satisfaction as an atoning substitute for 
humanity also figures in his explication of yet another key term, perhaps the 
key term for the Protestant Reformation-"justification": "JUSTIFICATION 
is THE JUDGMENT OF GOD, FREELY GIVEN, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH 
THOSE WHO ARE REGENERATE AND INGRAFTED IN CHRIST ARE 
ABSOLVED FROM SINS AND FROM DEATH THROUGH CHRIST'S 
ABSOLUTELY FULL SATISFACTION, AND ARE ACCOUNTED 
RIGHTEOUS IN THE SIGHT OF GOD, NOT BY THE WORKS OF THE 
LAW BUT THROUGH FAITH" (485, my emphasis). Then, citing Isa. 53:11, 
Rom. 5:9, 19 and 10:4, Milton echoes Luther's justification by faith in his 
explication of"THROUGH CHRIST'S  SATISFACTION": "Just as our sins, 
then, are imputed to Christ, so Christ's righteousness or merits are imputed 
to us, through faith" (486; Milton cites 1 Cor. 1:30, 2 Cor. 5:19, 21, Rom. 
4:6 and 5:19). Milton's satisfaction with Christ's satisfaction once again 
returns to the language of contractual penal-substitutionary atonement 
which I have been tracing in his theological discourse: "[s]o it is evident 
that our justification is freely given so far as we are concerned, but it is not 
free from Christ's point of view. He paid the price and imputed our sins to 
himself, and of his own free will washed them away and expiated them. We 
receive his righteousness imputed to us, as a gift. We pay nothing for it, 
we merely have to believe. Thus the Father is appeased, and pronounces all 
believers righteous. There could not be a simpler or more equitable method 
of satisfaction" (486, my emphases). It is also difficult to imagine a simpler, 
clearer statement of how this understanding of atonement functions as a 
basic theological datum for Milton. 
Finally, Milton explains how the Arian Christ which Chaplin finds 
inimical to substitutionary atonement effects precisely just such an 
atonement that for most of Milton's contemporaries required full Godhead. 
Milton makes it clear that innocence, purity, and complete obedience-but 
not Godhead-are required for an effective substitutionary sin sacrifice. 
Clearly addressing Trinitarians who do require full Godhead for the atoning 
sacrifice to be satisfactory, 8 Milton says, "So let us get rid of those arguments 
which are produced to prove that the person who was made flesh must 
necessarily be the supreme God. First of all there is that text from Heb. 
vii. 26, 27: such a high priest was fitting for us, holy, removed from all evil,
spotless, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens. But these
words do not prove even that he is God, let alone that he must have been
God" (425).9 In a third citation of this verse from Hebrews, Milton does
insist on the necessity of the miracle of the virgin birth, since the sacrificial
substitute must be free from original sin: "The aim of this miraculous
conception was to evade the pollution of Adam's sin. Heb. vii. 26: such a
high priest was fitting for us, holy, spotless, separate from sinners" ( 428). He
repeats this in the context of arguing that children of regenerate parents are
not born regenerate, but with original sin: "Christ alone was free from this
contagion [original sin], since he was produced by supernatural generation,
although descended from Adam: Heb. vii. 26: holy, spotless" (389-90). For
Milton, Christ does not need to be God to provide satisfaction and effect
redemption; he only needs to be free from original sin and fully obedient
to the will of God-an Arian Christ in no way precludes or impedes a
substitutionary atonement. 10 
The Son must also voluntarily take on this task, exercising his own 
free will to offer himself as a substitutionary sacrifice which satisfies divine 
justice. Milton represents this in book 3 of Paradise Lost, where the language 
of both the Father and the Son in the council in Heaven echoes the language 
of Milton's systematic theology. After the Father confirms his expressed 
intent to show grace to transgressing humanity, he works his way toward 
the question of who will mediate this grace to humanity by defining the 
terms by which that atonement must be effected: 
Man disobeying, 
Disloyal breaks his fealty, and sins 
Against the high Supremacy of Heav'n, 
Affecting God-head, and so losing all, 
To expiate his Treason hath naught left, 
But to destruction sacred and devote, 
He with his whole posterity must die, 
Die hee or Justice must; unless for him 
Some other able, and as willing, pay 
The rigid satisfaction, death for death, 
Say Heav'nly Powers, where shall we find such love, 
Which of ye will be mortal to redeem 
Man's mortal crime, and just th' unjust to save, 
Dwells in all Heaven charity so dear? (3.203-16, my emphases) 
Here the Father begins with the "sacrilege" Milton refers to in De Doctrina 
Christiana, the transgression against Divine law that renders not only Adam 
but all his posterity culpable and in need of atonement, and then moves 
on to the fundamental theological datum requiring atonement: "Die hee or 
Justice must:' He uses the Anselmian term adapted by the reformers, "rigid 
satisfaction;' and insists on the substitutionary nature of redemption: "for 
him ... death for death:' He insists that only love can fulfill this demand, 
emphasizing the term by including it as an extra syllable in an extended line 
and by repeating the word a second time in its cognate form, "charity:' 
In his response, the Son understands his voluntary sacrifice as a 
substitution which pays down the debt or penalty incurred by Adam's sin, 
thereby appeasing Divine wrath and satisfying Divine justice. The Son also 
understands that his death cannot be considered apart from his resurrection: 
Behold mee then, mee for him, life for life 
I offer, on mee let thine anger fall; 
Account mee man; I for his sake will leave 
Thy bosom, and this glory next to thee 
Freely put off, and for him lastly die 
Well pleas'd, on me let Death wreck all his rage; 
Under his gloomy power I shall not long 
Lie vanquisht; thou hast giv'n to me to possess 
Life in myself for ever, by thee I live, 
Though now to Death I yield, and am his due 
All of me that can die, yet that debt paid, 
Thou wilt not leave me in the loathsome grave 
His prey, nor suffer my unspotted Soul 
For ever with corruption there to dwell; 
But I shall rise Victorious, and subdue 
My vanquisher, spoil'd of his vaunted spoil. (3.236-51, my emphases) 
Here the Son willingly offers himself as a substitute for humanity, a sacrifice 
that will pay the due penalty to satisfy the Father's wrath. When he returns 
to Heaven with his redeemed, he will see the Father's face, "wherein no 
cloud / Of anger shall remain, but peace assur'd, / And reconcilement; wrath 
shall be no more" (262-64, my emphases). The Son clearly sees his sacrificial 
work as an effective appeasement of Divine anger. 
The Father responds by praising the Son, who has "the only peace / 
Found out for mankind under wrath" (274-75, my emphasis). The Father 
follows this with a verse summary of Milton's theological prose in De 
Doctrina Christiana: 
As in him [Adam] perish all men, so in thee 
As from a second root shall be restor'd, 
As many as are restor'd, without thee none. 
His crime makes guilty all his Sons, thy merit 
Imputed shall absolve them who renounce 
Thir own both righteous and unrighteous deeds, 
And live in thee transplanted, and from thee 
Receive new life. So Man, as is most just, 
Shall satisfy for Man, be judg'd and die, 
And dying rise, and rising with him raise 
His Brethren, ransom'd with his own dear life. (287-97, my emphases) 
Eventually the Father declares that the substitution works both ways: as 
the Son substitutes for guilty humanity and pays the penalty for sin, so 
this substitution will effect all believing humanity's participation in the 
Divine. The Father asserts that because in the Son "Love hath abounded 
more than Glory abounds, I Therefore thy Humiliation shall exalt / With 
thee thy Manhood also to this Throne" (312-14). Milton identifies the 
"Humiliation" which exalts humanity as the suffering and death-especially 
the ignominious death by crucifixion-of Christ (CPW 6, 439).11 
Finally, lest we think that only the Father and the Son present atonement 
in penal-substitutionary terms, the Miltonic narrator closes this scene with 
his own celebration of the Son's sacrificial love, rejoicing in a Son who 
expresses his Father's compassion with his very life: 
No sooner did thy dear and only Son 
Perceive thee purpos'd not to doom frail Man 
So strictly, but much more to pity inclin'd 
Hee to appease thy wrath, and end the strife 
Of Mercy and Justice in thy face discern'd, 
Regardless of the Bliss wherein hee sat 
Second to thee, offer'd himself to die 
For man's offense. 0 unexampl'd love, 
Love nowhere to be found less than Divine! 
Hail Son of God, Savior of Men, thy Name 
Shall be the copious matter of my Song 
Henceforth, and never shall my Harp thy praise 
Forget, nor from thy Father's praise disjoin. ( 403-15, my emphases) 
It is difficult not to hear Milton himself in these lines, deeply moved by the 
Son's sacrifice, as he employs his own favorite epithet for the Son in Paradise 
Regained: Savior. The Son is a savior who satisfies or appeases Divine 
anger-or justice-by offering himself as a substitute who will pay the price 
of redemption. As we will see in Michael's discourse on this redemption in 
book 12, that price can only be paid in blood. 
Michael's narrative presents an obvious obstacle to any attempt to render 
Milton our contemporary when it comes to responding to the crucifixion 
ofJesus and understanding the atoning work of his death. Critical attempts 
to overcome this obstacle have thus far relied on elision and dismissal of 
Michael's account. In his argument against Milton's commitment to penal­
substitutionary atonement, Chaplin, while he cannot deny the presence 
of Christ's sacrifice on the cross, claims that Milton "relegate[s] Christ's 
sacrifice to a few lines toward the end of Paradise Lost because he has already 
depicted the Son's definitive act of obedience and love" (361) in book 3. 
But Michael clearly depicts that "definitive act" as a penal-substutionary 
atonement, and-contrary to the rhetorical force of Chaplin's "relegate" -
the crucifixion arrives in book 12 as the necessary and crucial climax in the 
story of humanity's redemption. 
However, before Michael arrives at that moment in his narrative when 
he presents the crucifixion as an effective atonement for humanity, he lays 
the groundwork for the requirement of blood sacrifice for expiation of sin, 
a groundwork in turn founded on the discourse of atonement articulated 
in the council in Heaven. Michael explains to Adam that the Mosaic law 
can expose sin, and the contingent and provisional sacrifices offered by the 
Israelites under ceremonial rituals are instructive but not fully effective; the 
Lord's demand for "[t]he blood of bulls and goats" (12.292) instructs us, 
foreshadowing that 
Some blood more precious must be paid for Man, 
Just for unjust, that in such righteousness 
To them by Faith imputed, they may find 
Justification towards God, and peace 
Of conscience, which the Law by Ceremonies 
Cannot appease, nor Man the moral part 
Perform, and not performing cannot live. (293-99, my emphases) 
One purpose of the Law, Michael tells Adam, is to teach humanity that a 
blood sacrifice will be required to pay the penalty for human transgression 
and appease God (in this case, both God and God's "umpire;' conscience). 
This prepares Adam for the unexpected: a victory over Satan, Sin, and 
Death achieved not by glorious battle but by a "shameful and accurst" 
death: crucifixion. This is how God will reconcile humanity to himself. It is 
important to recognize that on this matter all four authoritative speakers­
the Father, the Son, the narrator, and Michael-agree and speak the same 
language of atonement. Milton does not offer any Bakhtinian dialogic on this 
issue, nor does he produce the kind of tension critics like Joseph Wittreich 
and Peter Herman have documented in other moments in Paradise Lost. 12 
Michael's narrative of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection focuses on 
its theological meaning, forgoing any graphic description of crucifixion. 
We might wonder, now that Adam is hearing the Word, not seeing it as 
vision, if Adam really knows what kind of death the Messiah faces. Thus 
Chaplin is right when he observes that Milton resists the "spectacle" of the 
crucifixion; in doing so, Milton follows the gospel writers and Paul, who 
also resist the "spectacle" of crucifixion. 13 But to claim therefore that Milton 
was unmoved by Christ's sacrificial death, or that he did not embrace a 
penal-substitutionary theory of atonement, constitutes a non sequitur.
Michael's account emphatically identifies Jesus' crucifixion in precisely the 
terms of this theory of atonement, marking the crucifixion as the means of 
its achievement. He tells Adam that "high Justice" can only "rest appaid" 
(401) by "suffering death,/ the penalty to thy transgression due" (398-99)
on the part of one who fulfills the Mosaic law "[b]oth by obedience and by
love, though love/ Alone fulfil the Law" (403-4). The Savior substitutes for
Adam and all his progeny: "thy punishment / He shall endure by coming
in the Flesh/ To a reproachful life and cursed death" (404-6). This "cursed
death" is death by crucifixion (Galatians 3.13), by which means the Son of
God will redeem all who believe, imputing his own perfect obedience to 
those who have faith in him and in his atonement:
For this he shall live hated, be blasphem'd, 
Seiz'd on by force, judg'd, and to death condemn'd 
A shameful and accurst, nail'd to the Cross 
By his own Nation, slain for bringing Life; 
But to the Cross he nails thy Enemies, 
The Law that is against thee, and the sins 
Of all mankind, with him there crucifi'd, 
Never to hurt them more who rightly trust 
In this his satisfaction. ( 412-19, my emphases) 
This is hardly a turning "away from the Passion;' nor has Milton "deftly 
converted" the Crucifixion "into an act of triumphant heroism" (Chaplin 
367) which excludes the violent and torturous blood sacrifice-substitute
required by Divine justice to appease God's wrath. For a poet who would
sing the greater heroism "Of Patience and heroic martyrdom" (9.31), these
two ways of seeing the Crucifixion are entirely compatible. Like Luther,
however, Milton does not separate the Crucifixion from the Resurrection;
Michael continues:
so he dies, 
But soon revives, Death over him no power 
Shall long usurp; ere the third dawning light 
Return, the Stars of Morn shall see him rise 
Out of his grave, fresh as the dawning light, 
Thy ransom paid, which Man from death redeems, 
His death for Man, as many as offer'd Life 
Neglect not, and the benefit embrace 
By Faith not void of works: this God-like act 
Annuls thy doom, the death thou shouldst have di'd, 
In sin for ever lost from life. (419-29, my emphases) 
Here we have again, pivoting on that Anselmian term-satisfaction-the 
language of the penal-substitutionary atonement theory embraced by most 
Protestant reformers. 
The understanding of atonement expressed in Milton's epics and in De 
Doctrina Christiana also appears briefly in Milton's final prose polemic, 
Of True Religion (1673). At a moment when Milton advocates tolerance 
for the many Protestant sects abounding in Restoration England, Milton 
identifies the importance of his understanding of satisfaction in Christ's 
atonement on the cross by marking his continuing disagreement with the 
Socinian position on atonement: "their other Opinions are of less Moment. 
They dispute the satisfaction of Christ, or rather the word Satisfaction, as 
not Scriptural: but they acknowledge him both God and their Saviour" 
(425, Milton's emphasis). 14 When Patrides remarks that "[t]here are few 
opinions Milton held more sincerely or more consistently than his view of 
the Atonement" (141), he implicitly recognizes that Milton was a dynamic 
theological thinker whose understanding of key Christian doctrines changed 
significantly during his life-the nature of the Godhead, the relation of 
soul and body, mortality, and Creation, to name a few. But Milton's view 
of the atonement as a substitutionary sacrifice providentially offered by the 
crucified Christ holds steady from his earliest poems, such as "Upon the 
Circumcision;' to his final prose treatise, Of True Religion. This is Milton's 
theology. However unethical or repulsive many of us who have devoted 
our lives to reading Milton may find this doctrine, a faithful account of 
Milton's prose and poetry grants the sincerity and importance of this belief 
to him; it is central to his Christian faith and understanding. But why is 
this understanding of Christ's crucifixion and atonement so important to 
Milton? 
In his recent essay on Milton's theology, William Poole poses a question 
much like this, puzzled by Milton's commitment to some form of Anselmic 
atonement despite his "dismantling" of Trinitarianism. 15 He offers as one 
possible answer Milton's politics, related to the execution of Charles I: 
It has recently been demonstrated that in the aftermath of the regicide, 
some pro-regicidal theologians felt obliged to re-affirm a model of justice 
that required strict retribution. Their supposed opponents had protested 
that "rigid satisfaction" was not required in all cases, and that England 
could have forgiven Charles I. Certain pro-regicidal theologians associated 
such political leniency with the theological analogue that God could have 
forgiven his Son. This shrewd polemic maneuver allowed Independent 
theologians such as John Owen to elide their Presbyterian enemies, who 
did not want Charles executed, with the feared and hated Socinians, for 
the most notorious Socinian tenet was indeed that it made no sense to 
claim that an omnipotent God was somehow forced to exact vengeance on 
man, let alone on himself. Milton, the foremost literary apologist for the 
regicide, here affirms the theological corollary: "Die he or Justice must:' 
( 479-80) 
This is a fair suggestion, if indeed Milton's motivations for espousing a penal­
substitutionary theory of atonement are political ( even if unconsciously so). 
But I wish to suggest two more obvious answers for Milton's continuing 
commitment to God's use and authorization of redemptive violence or 
sacrifice: because it is important to his personal Christian faith and because 
the Bible authorizes it. 
A biblicist like Milton may well have considered as unbiblical, if 
not anti-biblical, the manner in which poets like Donne and Herbert 
lingered in helplessness before the image of Christ crucified. The gospel 
narratives do not linger over the crucifixion; while clearly sharing the 
climax of the Jesus story with the resurrection, the violent death of Jesus 
is presented succinctly, as a fact, and then the narratives move on to burial 
and resurrection. The actual crucifixion itself is never described, and the 
agonizing pain that strikes Donne and Herbert is largely condensed into a 
single moment where Jesus cries out, with the gospels of Matthew and Mark 
attributing to Christ the phrase which Milton remarks in De Doctrina when 
he considers the humiliation of the crucifixion: "My God, my God, why 
hast thou forsaken me?" Neither does the apostle Paul linger over Christ's 
suffering on the cross, despite his repeated references to that cross. He does 
use language which the Protestant reformers draw on to develop into their 
penal-substitutionary theory of atonement, but we find nothing in Paul's 
letters like the detailed meditations of Donne and Herbert. 16 Perhaps most 
importantly, the Epistle to the Hebrews-which Jason Rosenblatt identifies 
as the most formative text for the final two books of Paradise Lost (218)­
details a doctrine of sacrificial atonement effected by Christ's death on the 
cross without gazing on-or lingering helplessly before-the "spectacle" of 
crucifixion. In fact, while not explicitly naming the crucifixion, one passage 
in Hebrews suggests that the crucifixion was likely considered so basic to 
the faith that it should not preoccupy the mature, regenerate Christian: 
For when for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one 
teach you again which be the first principles of the oracles of God; and 
are become such as have need of milk, and not of strong meat. For every 
one that useth milk is unskillful in the word of righteousness: for he is a 
babe. But strong meat belongeth to them that are of full age, even those 
who by reason of use have their senses exercised to discern both good and 
evil. Therefore leaving the principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go 
on unto perfection; not laying again the foundation of repentance from 
dead works, and of faith toward God, Of the doctrines of baptisms, and 
of the laying on of hands, and of resurrection of the dead, and of eternal 
judgment. (Heb. 5:12-6:2) 
Certainly the Milton who was a life-long Christian, deeply committed to his 
Christian faith, saw himself as a teacher, as one "of full age" skilled in the 
use of a "reason" that enabled him "to discern both good and evil:' Ready 
to eat "strong meat;' he had left "the principles of the doctrine of Christ" 
behind, not because he did not believe them or they were not vital to his 
faith, but because they were so basic, especially to his pervasively Christian 
culture, that there was hardly any need to speak of the crucifixion and 
resurrection of Jesus. He had no need to do the work of evangelism; he was 
instructing fellow Christians who had already embraced this basic doctrine. 
The biblical writers' own relative "neglect" of the "spectacle" of crucifixion 
authorizes and explains Milton's own; we have no need to speculate that 
he was somehow repulsed by blood atonement, or that his relation to the 
Crucifixion was "vexed" (Chaplin 357). Schoenfeldt may be quite right to 
argue that Milton in his epics is "far more interested in moral rectitude 
than in salvific suffering" (580), but to suggest that Milton experienced the 
crucifixion as a "sacrifice [ which] inevitably defeats human response" (581) 
is another non sequitur. Milton in fact responded to this sacrifice with a life 
of obedience and commitment to the one he repeatedly called "Savior:' 
If I may be allowed my own moment of unqualified speculation, I wish 
to suggest a reason why so many Milton scholars may sense in Milton a 
resistance to a theory of atonement which he-paradoxically-so clearly 
embraces in his texts. We find in Milton very little evidence of the anxiety 
that plagued his cultural moment and drove the success of the penal­
substitutionary theory of atonement. In The Courage To Be, Paul Tillich 
identifies three eras of "anxiety" and the theories of atonement which 
addressed those anxieties. The early centuries of the Christian church were 
haunted by the anxiety of fate and death, and the prominent theory of 
atonement was the Christus Victor theory-Christ's overcoming of sin and 
death in the crucifixion and resurrection liberated believers from the bondage 
of death, as Christ "recapitulated" and reversed the fateful disobedience 
of Adam and Eve in Eden. The medieval and Reformation periods were 
haunted by the anxiety of guilt and condemnation, and the substitutionary 
atonement theory provided a means to remove that guilt and condemnation, 
displacing it onto the suffering Christ, who appeased the mighty wrath of 
a just God on behalf of fallen humanity. But the modern era generates a 
different anxiety-that of meaninglessness and purposelessness. None of 
the previous theories of atonement addresses this anxiety, and the church 
has only just begun articulating theories of atonement that do address our 
contemporary uncertainty about ultimate meaning and purpose in life. 17 If 
Milton ever experienced the anxiety of guilt and condemnation addressed 
by his theory of atonement, it must have been in his early boyhood ( to 
which possibility I can attest), for we see little evidence of this in the adult 
Milton-perhaps in this sense Milton is indeed our contemporary. 18 And it 
may be that Milton's adherence to penal-substitutionary atonement theory 
is simply a dutiful response to what he finds in authoritative scripture, 
and the apparent absence of any felt need for such atonement leaves some 
readers wondering if Milton espoused such a doctrine. On the other hand, 
there is much about Milton's emotional life that we do not know, especially 
in his youth. It may be, as I have suggested, that Milton embraced Christ's 
redeeming sacrifice early in life with gratitude and rejoicing, and then he 
turned his focus to what that redemption enabled: a life of obedience to 
what he understood to be the will of the God who claimed him, who bought 
John Milton with the price of his Son's precious blood shed on the cross for 
satisfaction and appeasement of divine justice. Otherwise, we must imagine 
a Milton who removed the Epistle to the Hebrews from the biblical canon, 
substituting the Milton we want for the Milton we have. 
NOTES 
1For a survey of another surging tide, this one in Christian theology, that offers 
both a more ethical and a more relevant understanding of crucifixion and atone­
ment for our contemporary situation, see Marit Trelstad, ed., Cross Examinations
and especially Lutheran theologian Douglas John Hall's The Cross in Our Context.
In this respect, I must say that the critical readings of Milton reviewed in my open­
ing paragraphs offer an understanding of Milton I would be happy to embrace if it 
were true. 
2 Although there are a number of flaws in Rogers' argument, the primary frac­
ture results from his misreading "And that great Cov'nant which we still transgress 
/ Intirely satisfici" (21-22) as referring to the Abrahamic Covenant, which is sealed 
by circumcision, instead of the Mosaic Covenant (with the Decalogue at its core) 
that Milton clearly intends. Rogers makes no argument for reading "that great 
Cov'nant" as the Abrahamic covenant; he simply assumes this is the case. (I'd be 
willing to hear an argument for that against what seems to be an obvious reference 
to the Mosaic Law; every editor of current scholarly editions of Paradise Lost­
Hughes, Flannagan, Carey, Leonard, Orgel, Revard, and Kerrigan, et al.-reads the 
line as referring to the Mosaic covenant.) Milton includes the Christus Victor or 
"recapitulation" motif in his poetry, but it does not inform his primary understand­
ing of atonement. 
3Chaplin rightly identifies the Son's decision as primarily ethical, but he mis­
takenly excludes penal-substitutionary atonement in favor of the classical friend­
ship tradition. For an astute and engaging analysis of the nature of the Son's ethical 
decision-making at the moment he volunteers himself as a sacrifice for humanity's 
redemption, see Jeffrey S. Shoulson, "The King and I: the Stance of Theodicy in 
Midrash and Paradise Lost:' especially 71-73. 
4The difference between Milton and poets like Donne and Herbert can be ac­
counted for in a number of ways: temperament, religious heritage, and perhaps 
the fact that as priests in the English church-a vocation which the young Mil­
ton rejected-Donne and Herbert were continually re-enacting that sacrifice in a 
Eucharist-centered service, while Milton preferred a more Presbyterian or Inde­
pendent Word- or sermon-centered service. With respect to "The Passion:' it has 
become something of a critical commonplace to assume that Milton's decision not 
to finish this poem reflects a significant discomfort with the crucifixion; however, 
this remains mere speculation for which there is little to no evidence. We can just as 
reasonably take Milton at his word-that he was not up to the task of writing about 
something so important to him, and that he included the attempt in his published 
poems to identify the importance of the Passion to his faith. 
5Rogers claims that Milton was able, in Paradise Regained, "to narrate a Chris­
tian redemption, figured as the regaining of Paradise, that overlooked Crucifixion 
altogether" (189). But clearly the crucifixion appears in these lines, and Charles 
Huttar demonstrated three decades ago the presence of the Passion in Milton's brief 
epic: "The Passion of Christ in Paradise Regained:' More recently, Russel M. Hillier 
has added depth to Huttar's analysis in "The Wreath, the Rock and the Winepress: 
Passion Iconography in Milton's Paradise Regained:' 
6Rogers' treatment of Patrides is odd, to say the least. He claims that Patrides 
was writing in opposition to the "earlier, more daring, opinion ofE. M. W Tillyard" 
that Milton subconsciously rejected his conscious belief in the Crucifixion as an 
atoning sacrifice (189-90). But Patrides neither addresses nor cites Tillyard, who 
is utterly absent from Patrides' discourse. It appears to be Rogers who sets up the 
opposition, not Patrides. What makes this odd-especially Rogers' rhetorical use of 
the word "daring" to laud the "heretical" Tillyard and discount the "orthodox" and 
"safe" Patrides-is that Patrides signals his own discomfort with substitutionary 
atonement theory, and seems to wish that Milton had shared this discomfort. After 
noting that this theory of atonement has been identified as "immoral:' Patrides 
writes, "We cannot be absolutely certain whether some such notion had not oc­
curred to Milton as well; we can only suspect that it might have, principally because 
nearly every time God appears in Paradise Lost the poetry responds adversely, be­
coming flat, dull, monotonous" (141-42). Rogers ironically turns a friend into a 
foe: Patrides joins him in questioning the morality of substitutionary atonement 
theory. But Patrides appropriately acknowledges that Milton nevertheless joined 
the majority of his contemporaries in embracing this belief. 
7Jason Rosenblatt identifies Adam's sin in Paradise Lost as just such a sacrilege: 
"But Adam has transgressed a commandment divine rather than natural" (210). 
Rosenblatt's point is that Adam's logic in his long soliloquy in book 10, especially 
lines 794-98 and 801-08, fails because his premise is false-he speaks as if he had 
transgressed a "natural" command, not a "divine" command. Rosenblatt also 
observes that Adam is unaware of his allusion to Christ's atonement in 10.801-
4: "Rigor I Satisfi'd" echoes "rigid satisfaction' ' (3.212), or "Christ's satisfaction 
through torture and death" (213). Note Milton's repeated use of Anselm's term for 
atonement: satisfaction. 
8David Urban points out that for orthodox Trinitarians a Son who does not en­
joy "full deity" cannot "propitiate[e) the Father's holy wrath against sinful human­
ity"; an Arian Christ cannot "offer genuine forgiveness of sins" (235). 
9Milton carries this argument forward, with emphatic repetition, for four pages. 
10This is why the Father can offer the role/task of redeemer to all of the angels 
during the heavenly council in book 3. And this is why Adam could have offered 
himself to redeem Eve before his own fatal tasting of the forbidden fruit in book 
9 of Paradise Lost. This is also crucial for understanding just what is accomplished 
in Paradise Regained. The brief epic does not present the redemption of humanity 
but what makes that redemption possible-again, why the angelic hymn ends with 
"now begin to save mankind" (PR 4.635). Paradise is a state of innocence, of utter, 
complete obedience to God's will. To regain Paradise is to regain this obedience, 
this state of innocence; only one who is innocent can offer the redeeming sacrifice 
demanded by God's justice. This is what Jesus does in resisting Satan's temptation: 
fully obedient to God's will in his humanity, he establishes an innocence that merits 
an effective atonement when he voluntarily offers himself in sacrifice. Because of 
this effective atoning sacrifice, believers like Milton are now free to obey God fully 
and attain this same Paradise-but this would not be possible without the sacrifice, 
without the crucifixion and resurrection. 
llHere is yet another instance of the kind of chiasmus that Jeffrey Shoulson 
discovers in Milton's "understanding of the dialectical nature of accommodation, 
upward and downward, divine and human'' (Milton and the Rabbis 188). 
12See Joseph Wittreich, Why Milton Matters, and Peter C. Herman, Destabiliz­
ing Milton. 
13Gerard S. Sloyan notes that by the time Paul offers what is allegedly the first 
written articulation of "the gospel" (1 Cor. 15:3), "[t]the center of gravity in the 
narrative has evidently shifted, some decades before, from the cruel manner of 
his death to the simple fact of death" (68). Paul's priority for Protestant reformers 
like Luther and Calvin is common knowledge, and he was of course prior in early 
Christian narrative, writing well before the completion and circulation of the ca­
nonical gospel narratives. Milton's own primary reliance on Paul for understanding 
Christ's atonement is evident in De Doctrina Christiana. 
14For the most helpful discussion of Milton's relation to Socinianism, see Mi­
chael Lieb's chapter, "The Socinian Imperative;' in his Theological Milton. Lieb notes 
Milton's hermeneutical affinities with Socinians while demonstrating Milton's doc­
trinal differences from them, especially with respect to atonement: "Milton endors­
es the doctrine of satisfaction throughout his poetry" (329). 
15Poole recognizes the Anselmic tradition in Milton's atonement theory, but 
he does not discern the "penal-substitutionary" theory delineated by Patrides. The 
question he poses is the question Chaplin would have done better to answer in his 
own essay, but Chaplin's determination to force Milton's representation of the Son's 
sacrifice into the ethics of the Renaissance friendship tradition occludes Milton's 
clear commitment to penal-substitutionary atonement through Christ's crucifix­
ion. Interestingly, for such a political thinker, Milton does not appear to ever politi­
cize the crucifixion or atonement. 
16As Douglas John Hall demonstrates, Paul's interest in Christ's suffering fo­
cuses primarily on its value as both model and consolation for his own suffering 
and the suffering experienced by many in the early church (138-39; Hall examines 
Rom. 5:1-5 and 2 Cor. 4:5-11). Shoulson is on to this when he examines the role of 
"suffering for truth's sake" in Milton's theology and practice, but he misunderstands 
the role of suffering in the believer's experience as in itself salvific (Milton and the 
Rabbis 221-27). Neither Milton nor Paul ever asserts this. 
17I have summarized Tillich, 32-63. For some contemporary Christian attempts 
to understand atonement in our own cultural moment, see again Trelstad and Hall. 
18Richard Strier offers another compelling possibility for Milton's apparent lack 
of a sense of guilt and condemnation in his superb essay, "Milton against Humility:' 
However, he mistakes the role of human effort in effecting redemption, decontex -
tualizing remarks from De Doctrina Christiana which, when re-contextualized, do 
not support his contentions regarding, "Christian soteriology" (269). First, Strier 
contends that "Milton holds that even in the post-lapsarian world, 'everyone is pro­
vided with a sufficient degree of innate reason to be able to resist evil desires by his 
own effort' (DDC 186; emphasis mine)" (269). While this is sufficient to establish 
the value and purchase of classical ethics, it does not refer to attaining redemp­
tion, unless Milton is blatantly contradicting himself in the same paragraph. Just 
a few lines before the passage cited by Strier, Milton asserts that " [ o) ne thing may 
be established at the outset: although all men are dead in sin and children of wrath, 
nevertheless some are worse than others" (DDC 186, my emphasis). This preced­
ing context clarifies that Milton is not referring to any effort to attain salvation. 
Similarly, when Strier asserts that " [ s] alvation is not by faith alone-'our own effort 
is always required' ( 480)" (269), reading back to the page just before this remark 
reveals that Milton is talking about the result or effect of salvation, about the effort 
the already regenerate man must put forth to do good works-Strier has miscon­
strued Milton's point. 
_j 
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